Constantine SANDIS, FRSA, University of Hertfordshire

 
Hume’s overall project proceeds by way of a conceptual revisionism that emerges from his Copy Principle. This, I argue, involves re-calibrating our philosophical reasonings to match the range of impressions that human beings actually have. Having thus rid ourselves of a certain kind of metaphysical ambition, we are left with perfectly adequate account of how it is that people can act in character, freely, and for good reasons. The resulting picture is one that unifies Hume's practical and theoretical philosophy by situating his account of action and its explanation within a wider understanding of our concepts of causation, free will, historiography, morality, necessity, personal identity, and the self. Far from being restricted to a few disappointing remarks on volitionism, Hume’s philosophy of action thus emerges as *the* central topic of his work. In his own words: ‘as nothing more nearly interests us than our own actions and those of others, the greatest part of our reasonings is employ’d in judgments concerning them' (T 405/2.3.1.15).