On a Recent Attempt to Settle the Issues of the Cognitive Significance and Dynamics of Indexical Thoughts

I review Bozickovic's proposal (in Bozickovic 2015, 2021) to settle two interrelated issues: (i) that of the cognitive significance of indexical thoughts expressed at a time in the face of difficulties posed by cases in which the subject either mistakes two objects for one, or one for two different objects; (ii) that of their cognitive dynamics in the face of difficulties posed by cases in which the belief seems to be retained while the proper adjustments fail to be made (i.e. in cases such as Rip Van Winkle’s). I argue that, despite its elegance and merits, the proposal falls short of accounting for the problematic cases in their full complexity. For one thing, the intended non-modal construal of Frege's Criterion of Difference does not block (or so I argue) the “proliferation” of senses brought about by the occasion-sensitivity of the individuation of demonstrative thoughts. For another, the proposal fails to appreciate the need for the subject to have an adequate conception of the object of her thought when it comes to orienting herself in space and time. That being so, I conclude that neither (i) nor (ii) is settled.