Robins
Robins
Séminaire

Sarah Robins (University of Kansas)

le 10 juillet 2019
In defense of memory traces
Centre de philosophie de la mémoire
Séminaire public
10 juillet 2019. 14h00. Salle B1 (ARSH).

In defense of memory traces
Sarah Robins (University of Kansas)

Abstract: Memory traces have a long and controversial history. They have been a part of our theorizing about memory for as long as there has been theorizing about memory, but their role has always been both divisive and elusive. The question of whether remembering involves memory traces serves as something of a fault line along which views of memory can be sorted, including the current division between causal and post-causal theories (Michaelian & Robins, 2018). And those who endorse memory traces often rely on metaphors to illustrate them, leaving their role in a theory of remembering unclear. In this paper, I argue that memory traces are essential to a theory of remembering, but that no satisfactory, general account of memory traces has yet been given. I do so by introducing four desiderata. A theory of remembering should be able to explain/account for: 1) memory’s distinctiveness, 2) distinctive remembering, 3) memory’s theoretical flexibility, and 4) flexible remembering. Non-trace theories fail to explain 1) and 2). Existent trace theories explain 1) and 2), but fail at 3) and 4). I conclude with a sketch of a general account of memory traces that can accommodate all of these explanatory desiderata.

Centre de philosophie de la mémoire : http://phil-mem.org/

Localisation

Salle B1, bât. ARSH
1281 Av. Centrale, Domaine universitaire de Saint Martin d'Hères
Mis à jour le 9 juillet 2019